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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
LEGAL PHASES OF THE SHANTUNG QUESTION
By HAROLD SCOTT QUIGLEY*
T HE Versailles Peace Conference awarded the German rights,
title and privileges in Shantung Province to Japan.' This
award was the climax of nearly five years of military and diplo-
matic effort through which Japan had captured Tsingtao, taken
possession of the German and Sino-German properties, both pub-
lic and private, throughout Shantung, and made "gentlemen's
agreements" with Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy, recog-
nizing her right to retain what she had won.- To this award
China refused to become a signatory, resting her refusal upon
legal and ethical grounds.' To examine the former, some phases
of which have received scant attention, is the purpose of this
article.
The legal argument of the Chinese Government for the direct
restitution of the leased territory of Kiaochao, together with the
railway and mining rights which Germany possessed in Shantung
before the war, advanced one principal and two secondary points.
If this presefitation of alternatives is prejudicial to China's case
the ambiguity of international law as applied to certain elements
of the problem justly counterbalances prejudice. Even in courts
of municipal law, furthermore, the parties are reluctant to rest a
case upon a single legal principle or line of reasoning.
The principal legal proposition put forward by 'Mr. Lu
Cheng-hsiang and his associates at Versailles and maintained con-
6istently by the Chinese Government since, is that, in consequence
of China's declaration of war on the Central Powers and accom-
panying declaration of abrogation concerning " agreements and
conventions heretofore concluded between China and Germany,
and between China and Austria-HungarV, as well as such parts
of the international protocols and international agreements as
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
This article was written at Tsing Hua College, Peking, China, while on
leave of absence.-Ed.
'Treaty of Peace, Articles 156, 157, 158.
22 MacMurray, J. V. A., Treaties and Agreements with and concern-
ing China, 1894-1919, 1919-21, 1488. Also in China Year Book, 192r-2,
707-7,1.
'China Year Book, 1921-2, 711-713.
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concern only the relations between China and Germany and be-
tween China and Austria-Hungary,"' the lease convention of
1898 under which Germany had administered Kiaochao and en-
joyed other specified privileges had been abrogated.! Anticipatory
of the necessity of meeting the argument that in ratifying in 1915
a treaty with Japan by which "the Chinese Government agrees
to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Gov-
ernment may hereafter agree with the German Government relat-
ing to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which
Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation
to the Province of Shantung,"' China's argument distinguishes the
position of China after her declaration from that which she occu-
pied at the time the Sino-Japanese treaty of May 25, 1915 was
concluded. At the latter date China was neutral and her ratifica-
tion was "clearly subject . . . to the implied condition that
China remained neutral throughout the war, and therefore, would
be unable to participate in the final Peace Conference .
China's entry into the war so vitally changed the situation con-
templated in the treaty, that, on the principle of rebus sic stantibus,
it ceases to be applicable."
Regarding this argument as sound the Chinese Government
nevertheless included in its brief two alternative propositions;
both of these contemplate the contention that the abrogation de-
claration was ineffective against a prior treaty guaranteeing that of
which the abrogation would operate as a deprivation; the first
sets up the alternative that the treaty was void ab initio because
imposed with force majeure;' the second alleges the incompetency
of Germany to transfer the leased territory to a third power.' This
allegation is based upon the fifth article of section 1, Lease of
Kiaochao, by which "Germany engages at no time to sublet the
territory leased from China to another Power."'0
Since the Chinese Government has relied rather upon the
former than the two latter lines of argument, the latter will be
dealt with first. That which rests the incompetency of the Sino-
'Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Official Documents relating to War
(for 1917), 14.
'China Year Book, 1921-2, 667-8.
'Same, 667.
'China Year Book, 1921-2, 667.
'Chinese White Book, cited in IO New York Times Current History
Magazine, ii, 550.
'China Year Book, 1921-2, 667-8.
"Same, 669.
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Japanese treaty of 1915 upon Japan's use of force majeure appears
to be without adequate basis in international law. No statement
could be clearer than the following from a recent revision of
Oppenheim's treatise: "It must, however, be understood that cir-
cumstances of urgent distress, such as either defeat in war, or
the menace of a strong state to a weak state, are, according to
the rules of international law, not regarded as excluding the
freedom of action of a party consenting to the terms of a treaty.
The phrase 'freedom of action' applies only to the representatives
of the contracting states."" John Bassett Moore points out that:
"Coercion, while invalidating a contract produced by it, does not
invalidate a treaty so produced."'  He also quotes Bernard to the
same effect: "It is commonly laid down that neither the plea of
duress nor that of laesio enormis, [a degree of hardship, that is,
so plain and gross that the sufferer cannot be supposed to have
contemplated what he was undertaking] -pleas recognized,
directly or circuitously, in one form or another, by municipal law
both ancient and modern, can be allowed to justify the nonfulfil-
ment of a treaty." Vattel takes the same view: "On ne peut se
d6gager d'un trait6 de paix en all6guant qu'il a 6t6 extorqu6 par
la crainte ou arrach6 de force.'' Phillipson, writing in 1916,
qualifies his statement of the law: "In the case of conventions
established during peaceful relationships, duress may generally
be deemed a ground for repudiation; but in a treaty of peace,
force and compulsion cannot be so held."'3 He does not, however,
cite any cases in support of this distinction. Hall attaches to
his general statement that international law "regards all com-
pacts as valid, notwithstanding the use of force and intimidation"
the condition that these compacts "do not destroy the independ-
ence of the State which has been obliged to enter into them.""
Westlake and Lawrence do not qualify the rule. The practical
unanimity of these authorities is sufficient warrant for rejecting
the argument from force majeure on legal, however strong it
may be on moral, grounds.
"i International Law, 3rd ed., 66o.
"5 International Law Digest, 183.
"Lectures on Diplomacy, 184; quoted in I. L. D. V. 184.
"Droit des gens, liv. IV, chap. iv., sec. 37.
"Phillipson, Coleman, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace, 162.
"International Law, 6th ed., 319.
"I Westlake International Law 29o; Lawrence Principles of Interna-
tional Law, 6th ed., 327.
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The second alternative proposition advanced by the Chinese
Government is that Germany was estopped from the transfer of
her lease to Japan by a term of the lease itself.' This provision
is peculiar to the Kiaochao lease; those of Port Arthur, Wei-
Hai-Wei, Kowloon and Kuang-Chow-Wan have no explicit
statement; an argument that the latter are non-transferable may
however, be made on the basis of the general nature of such
leases. Involving, as they do, a temporary grant of administrative
jurisdiction as well as the possession of territory, the consent of
the transferor has been "overborne by superior force; and the
argument is concluded under duress . . . If the lessor is un-
willing, though he is by force of circumstances constrained, to
make the conveyance, it is inconceivable that he should consent
to its transfer to a third party."' It is difficult to see the logic of
Dr. Tyau's inference; if a forced lease is legal ab initio, its legality
would appear to be unaffected by a continuance of the application
of force majeure such as a transfer of lease would imply. In
1905, it is true, Russia transferred the Liaotung peninsula to
Japan "with the consent of the Government of China" but that
the consent was ex post facto is revealed by the paragraph fol-
lowing that of the transfer, in which "the two High Contracting
Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese
Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation."'  The con-
sent, given by that government in the Komura treaty, was given
under duress and to the transferee, not the transferor.Y The two
treaties of transfer, like the original treaty of lease, recognize
the ultimate sovereignty of China over the leased area. In neither
situation does there appear to be apprehension that such recogni-
tion would operate against transfer.
Where, however, an express agreement not to transfer has
been incorporated in the treaty of lease, the issue becomes two-
fold. That Germany was bound not to make a voluntary assign-
ment of Kiaochao is evident; to that extent the special stipula-
tion was of importance since it guaranteed the Chinese Govern-
ment against any exchange which Germany might regard as ad-
""Germany engages at no time to sublet the territory leased from
China to another Power." Art. 5, sec. 2; i MacMurray 1898-4 114.
"Tyau, Treaty Obligations between China and other States, 69.
'Treaty of Portsmouth, Art. V.; i MacMurray, 1905-8, 523. Also
in Takahashi, International Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War,
Appendix IV.
ni MacMurray, i9o5-i8, 55o.
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vantageous. The probability of such voluntary transfer was, how-
ever, extremely remote. On the other hand there was the pos-
sibility, later to become reality, that Germany would be com-
pelled by force majeure to surrender her lease to another Power.
In that contingency the obligation of Germany would be dissolved
under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus? or become void through
impossibility of performance." Since the transfer of the Kiaochao
lease took place under conditions of force majeure, the necessary
reply to the second alternative proposition of the Chinese Govern-
ment is a denial of its legal effectiveness.
Throughout the argument upon this proposition the word
"transfer" has been used as equivalent to the German words
"weiter verpachten" which are. properly translated "sublet" in
English texts of the treaty." The broader words "jang," "chian
jang," and "chuan,"" all meaning transfer, have been used inter-
changeably with the narrower word "chuan ch'u," which appears
in the Chinese text of the original lease, by the spokesmen of
the Chinese Government at the Peace Conference and subse-
quently. To this wider interpretation of the terms of Article V
the Japanese Government appears to have taken no exception.
To sublet is to set up a relationship between the lessee and a new
tenant, clearly a different proceeding from that involved in the
Japanese conquest of Kiaochao. The translation "sublet," there-
fore, would be still less advantageous to the argument of the
Chinese Government than that of "transfer" though it may be
argued that an agreement not to sublet would imply the obliga-
tion to refrain from transfer.
The principal legal proposition advanced by China does not
depend upon either of the propositions discussed above. It rests
upon the "general rule that war abrogates the treaties existing
between the belligerents . . ."" In accordance with this prin-
ciple, in declaring a state of war to exist between China and the two
"See I Oppenbeim 688-693; I Westlake 295-297; Foster, Practice of
Diplomacy 299-300.
"31 Oppenheim 694.
"Deutschland verpflichtet sich, das von China gepachtete Gebiet
niemals an eine andere Macht weiter zu verpachten." Second paragraph
of Article V., "Convention for the Lease of Kiaochow, 1898;" in Treaties,
Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States, 3 Imperial Maritime
Customs, 30 Miscellaneous Series II, 946.
"Me'morandum concerning Shantung (prepared for the use of the
Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference) 4, 15.
'Customs, Treaties, etc. 947.
"2 Westlake 32.
LEGAL PHASES OF THE SHANTUNG QUESTION 385
principal Central Powers, the Chinese Government declared the
consequent abrogation of its treaties and other agreements with
them. At Versailles and in the recent interchange of corre-
spondence with Japan, the position of China has been that the
"lease of Kiaochao Bay expired immediately on China's declara-
tion of war with Germany.""
To the general rule that war abrogates all inter-belligerent
treaties international law admits exceptions. Arrangements to
regulate war, transitory or dispositive treaties, and conventions
including signatory third powers are the exceptions usually recog-
nized.- Whether the treaty for the lease of Kiaochao is to be
included under the general rule or under an exception depends
upon the nature of the lease.
The leases of territory which have been- embodied in conven-
tions are of two principal types, the lease in perpetuity and the
lease for a term of years. In the first category are the lease of
the Panama Canal Zone held by the United States,' the lease by
the Sultan of Zanzibar of his mainland possessions to the British
East Africa Company, made perpetual in 1891 and later annexed
to the Crown, ' and the leases of "concessions" for foreign settle-
ment at Tientsin, Hankow, Kiukiang, Newchwang, Canton and
other Chinese ports ; in the second the group of leases secured
by four of the powers from China in 1898, in each of which a
term of years was specified. ' Agreement is unanimous that the
lease in perpetuity is equivalent to cession. The rescission of the
German concessions at Hankow and Tientsin and the Austro-
Hungarian concession at Tientsin, which resulted from the Great
War, was not a product of the declaration of abrogation but of
the defeat of Germany. There is excellent authority to support
the contention that leases for a term of years are "disguised"
cessions. Writers who take this view make no distinction between
leases in perpetuity and leases for a term of years and none on
the basis of length of term. *They regard the reservation df
sovereignty, express or implied, as a disguise for a situation
amounting to annexation and contemplated as leading to annexa-
"
'Chinese Memorandum to Japan," Oct. 5, i921, Peking and Tientsin
Times, Oct. 7, 1921.
-2 Westlake 32-34; 2 Oppenheim, 2nd ed, 129-131; Lawrence 360-365.3 'Malloy's Treaties.
31I Westlake 135.
"-Morse, Trade Administration of China, Chap. VIII.
331 MacMurray (Liaotung) 1898-5, 119-121.; (Wei-Hai-,Vei) 1898-14
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tion. It is somewhat surprising that this view is frequent in the
French treatises since the French school of international law is
notable rather for its emphasis upon the letter of the law than the
practice which often evades it. Among others Ernest Nys," A.
Rivier," Perrinjaquet," and Louis Gerard" may be cited as lib-
eral constructionists upon the issue in question. Lawrence,
Westlake, ' who quotes Despagnet, and, following him, Pitt-Cob-
bet t ' also emphasize the "disguise" to be detected in what purport
to be leases for a term of years only. Hershey classifies the lease
for a term of years as a "disguised or indirect" cession.,
The qualifying terms, such as "unlikely," "practical," "matter
of fact," etc., which modify the views of these writers indicate
their hesitation to support the establishment of a principle by
reading between the lines when the lines of the lease themselves
clearly favor the lessor state by the reservation of sovereignty
during the existence of the lease and by prescribing a definite
duration of its existence:
"His- Majesty the Emperor of China . . . engages, while re-
serving to himself all rights of sovereignty in a zone of 50 kilo-
metres (100 Chinese li) surrounding the Bay of Kiaochow at
high water ' His Majesty the Emperor of China leases to
152-3; (Kiaochao) 1898-4, 112-116; (Kwangchouwan) I898-7, 124.
'"'L'acquisition du territoire et le droit international," in Revue de
Droit International 36, 1904, 376.
"i Principles du Droit des gens i8o.
'Revue generale de Droit international public 16, I9o9, 349-367.




'i Leading Cases iio.
"Essentials of International Public Law 184.
'Article I; The respective German and Chinese' words used in this
sentence are rechte der Souverfnitdit and chu chilan, both meaning sover-
eignty; in article III. (II. 946) where some English translations, e. g.
that used by Professor Hershey in 13 American Journal of International
Law 533, read, "in virtue of rights of sovereignty over the whole of the
water area of the bay . . .," while others read rights of administration,
the respective German and Chinese words are hoheitsrechte and kuan
shih, meaning respectively rights of sovereignty and rights of adminis-
tration. From the Chinese point of view no distinction was intended
between the status of the water area and the land area involved in the
lease; over both China's sovereignty was reserved. The official an-
nouncement of the German Government made no distinction between
the status of the land and the water area-: "the Imperial Chinese Gov-
ernment has transferred to the German Government, for the period of
the lease, all its sovereign rights in the territory in question." (i West-
lake 136). Since this statement recognizes that the lease is for a period
of years it recognizes by inference the reservation of China's sovereignty;
hence the terms rights of sovereignty and rights of administration are
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Germany, provisionally for ninety-nine years, both sides of the
entrance to the Bay of Kiaochow."'
Westlake recognizes that "when property is leased, the lessor re-
tains a proprietary right which runs concurrently with the lessee's
right of enjoyment. If therefore the analogy were closely
pressed, the state which grants a lease of territory would be held
to retain all the time some sort of sovereignty over it."" Pitt-
Cobbett prefaces the conclusion stated above with premises that
hardly lead him logically to his conclusion:
"As to the effect of such international leases, it would seem
strictly that, whilst conferring rights of user and enjoyment on
the lessee, yet the territory remains subject to the sovereignty of
the lessor, and subject also to any prior obligations specifically
attached thereto. The reservation of sovereignty, moreover, might
also be said to imply the obligation on the part of the lessee not to
use the territory to the prejudice of the lessor."''
Oppenheim points out that while "such cases comprise, for all
practical purposes, cessions of pieces of territory . . . in strict law
they remain the property of the leasing state."" His position is
directly contradictory to that taken by writers cited above:
"And such property is not a mere fiction, as some writers main-
tain, for it is possible for the lease to come to an end by expira-
tion of time or by rescission. Thus the lease of the so-called Lado
Enclave, granted in 1894 by Great Britain to the former Congo
Free State, [which an anonymous writer in I, R. G. D. I. P., 380,
cited by Westlake, I, 136 , n. 1, declared to be 'not a true letting
but an alienation'] was rescinded in 1906.".
Hall takes an even more definite stand for strict interpretation:
"These and such like privileges or disabilities are the creatures,
not of law, but of compact . . . They conform to the universal
rule applicable to jura in re aliena. Whether they be customary
or contractual in their origin, they must be construed strictly.
If, therefore, a dispute occurs between a territorial sovereign and
a foreign power as to the extent or nature of rights enjoyed by
the latter within the territory of the former, the presumption is
against the foreign state, and upon it lies the burden of proving
its claim beyond doubt or question."'
The Naval War College concluded that: "the general position









assumed by the powers is not that sovereignty has passed, but
that the jurisdiction to the extent named in the treaty of cession
has passed to the leasing power."'" John Bassett Moore does
not admit political considerations into the interpretation of a
lease. In a letter responding to an inquiry from a friend of the
writer he wrote:
"The English versions that have been published . . . are not ac-
curate. They are even more favorable to Germany than the Ger-
man text of the agreement, while the Chinese text is distinctly
less favorable to Germany than is the German text . . . From
this it is easy to infer that, in the case of those who have sought
to treat the Chinese leases as 'disguised cessions,' the wish has
been father to the thought. Personally I am not inclined to ac-
cord to governments, any more than to individuals, the benefit of
the doubt in the interpretation of instruments the acceptance of
which they impose upon others by force."'
As would be anticipated, Chinese writers are strict construction-
ists. M. T. Z. Tyau regards the leases granted by China as "a
species of international servitudes" to be "construed strictly
against the beneficiary states."" Wen Sze King takes the same
view.'
From the foregoing summary of opinion regarding the na-
ture of the leases of which that of Kiaochao is typical, the neces-
sary conclusion from the legal standpoint is that they are what
they are entitled, leases for a definite term of years, to be sur-
rendered at the expiration of the term. Thus the Sino-German
lease treaty of 1898 was not a pactum transitorium, setting up a
permanent state of things such as would be done by a peace treaty
in determining a boundary. Since there can be no argument that
it belonged to either of the other excepted categories it fell neces-
sarily within one of those susceptible of abrogation by war or by
declaration upon the outbreak of war. In view of its clauses pro-
viding for administrative powers, the better conclusion would
seem to be that it was a political treaty not contemplated as es-
tablishing a permanent condition of things.
The question now arises: did China forfeit her right of abro-
"Naval War College 1902, p. 32.
'Letter of Mar. 25, 1921.
"
tTreaty Obligations 68.
"The Lease Conventions between China and the Foreign Powers,"in i Chinese Social and Political Science Review, 25-26. He quotes
Bluntschli, Le Droit international 2o9, I Phillimore International Law
391, and Wilson, International Law 153, in support of strict construc-
tion of international servitudes.
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gation by consenting to the Shantung clauses of the Twenty One
Demands quoted above? As already stated China's argument
invokes the principle of rebus sic stantibus. The status of a co-
belligerent and participant in the peace treaty, she has contended,
is vitally different from that of a neutral. As a neutral she had
no right to abrogate treaties and as such she submitted to the
Japanese ultimatum. It would hardly be argued that the ultima-
tum would have been served upon China had she been associated
with the Allies at that time. In logic, the difference in her cir-
cumstances upon becoming a belligerent was entitled to the same
respect as it would have received two years previously; a vital
difference in 1915, it was equally so in 1917. In view of all the
circumstances her argument is sound.3
It might have been argued by the Chinese Government that
the word "possesses," used in the first article of the 1915 treaty
with Japan, was contemplated as to become applicable at the date
vhen China actually was to "give full assent," i. e., at the date of
the treaty of peace. Until then, Japan's title could be one of
conquest only. If, in the meantime, Germany's possessions in
Shantung province should be brought under the title of China,
the "rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue
of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of
Shantung" would be nil. Hence there would be nothing for the
German Government to transfer to Japan and nothing for China
to agree to. Under this interpretation the question of the es-
toppel of the right of abrogation would not arise.
China did not request Japan to release her from the Shan-
tung agreement, nor did she declare herself no longer bound by
it. In her mind, release from that engagement was implied in the
declaration of abrogation of German privileges in Shantung
which accompanied her declaration of war. By that declaration
China resumed the leasehold and other concessions, subject to
"'According to Dr. Ferguson's testimony, quoted by Willoughby,
Foreign Rights and Interests in China 392, n. 13, in reaching her con-
clusion in China "took the advice of two eminent French international
lawyers, of the most eminent Russian jurist who was known to the
President of the Board of Foreign Affairs, who formerly had been Min-
ister in St. Petersburg; of an eminent Dutch jurist of Holland and of
an eminent international jurist from Belgium, and based her claim on
the advice which was given her by the jurists, that is, that her declara7-
tion of war against Germany, notwithstanding her contract which had
already been made in 1915 with Japan, of itself vitiated not only the
German lease but also the treaty with Japan." Dr. Ferguson stated
that this was the unanimous opinion of these jurists.
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such private claims as international law would allow. Her re-
sumption did not wait upon the peace conference but was legally
complete immediately. Thereupon Japanese possession should
have come to an end.'
The Chinese Government has not questioned the legality of
Japan's conquest of the leased territory, though, as above noted,
it has denied the validity of the transfer by Germany; its claims
of violated neutrality have been concerned with the use of
Chinese territory not under lease. In 1904 Secretary Hay, after
consulting with the representatives of other interested powers,
requested Russia and Japan to respect the neutrality of China.
His note suggested that this could be done by localizing and limit-
ing the area of hostilities as much as possible. Both the belliger-
ents acquiesced in this policy, with the explicit reservation by
Japan, of "the regions occupied by Russia" and by Russia, of
Manchuria; the United States accepted both constructions of
neutrality as satisfactory." The Japanese limitation, narrower
than the Russian, was put into force by the Chinese Government,
which made no protest against the use of the Liaotung penin-
sula, east of the Liao river, as an area of war; inter alia Prince
Ch'ing wrote thus to Minister Conger:
"But at such places in Manchuria as are still in charge of a
foreign power and from which its troops have not yet withdrawn,
China's strength is insufficient, and it will be perhaps difficult to
strictly observe the laws of neutrality there.'"'
Lawrence concluded that "the experience of the Russo-Japanese
struggle of 1904-1905 shows conclusively that for all purposes of
war and neutrality leased territory must be regarded as a part of
the dominion of the power that exercises full control over it.,"
During the joint attack of the Japanese and British forces upon
Tsingtao the Chinese Government was concerned, not with pro-
testing against the carrying of war into a leased territory, nor
even against the use of adjacent territory for the movement of
Japanese troops, but with the delimitation of a military zone ex-
teiding about 100 miles west of Tsingtao, beyond which she
would maintain neutrality.' When the German Government pro-
'Japan raised no protest against the abrogation declaration until
the peace conference.
'Foreign Relations of the United States, 19o4, 2-3.
'Same 121-2.
"Principles 176-7.
'Declaration of Sept. 3 (5), 1914; in China Year Book, 1921-2, 662.
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tested against the military zone, China replied that while desirous
of preventing belligerent operations upon her territory, she had
been unable to do so and refused to be held responsible for the
enforcement of strict neutrality within the zone." Logically
there seems to be no reason for denying to a belligerent the right
to attack the possessions as well as the property of his enemy,
nor is the failure to deny the right an admission that a lease is
merely a cession in disguise, since the restrictions upon the for-
mer tenant continue upon the new. The consideration shown to
the lessor is indeed cavalier but no less so than at the original de-
mand for the lease. As stated by Prince Ch'ing in 1904: "No
matter which of the two powers may be victorious or defeated
the sovereignty of the frontier territory of Manchuria will still
revert to China as an independent government."'  China held
the same view regarding Kiaochao in 1914.
This argument does not resolve the question whether Japan
was legally capable of occupying the Shantung Railway through-
out its length. Since China is her own sole guarantor of neutral-
ity, Japan's right to disregard her proclamation of neutrality is
clear, provided that no arrangement had been made, as in the
Russo-Japanese War, to respect it. No such arrangement has
been published though the Chinese Government has asserted that
an "understanding" was reached with the Japanese Government
according to which Japanese troops were not to encroach west-
ward of the Weihsien station." Japan argued however that her
occupation of the railway was not a. violation of Chinese neutral-
ity, since the road was German property and a menace to her
position in Kiaochao; she justified her conquest of the railway by
assimilating its status with that of the leased territory.' As the
concession for the railway was a term of the lease and in view
of the control exercised over it by the German Government, the
railway in fact was a projection of the leased area.
Account must be taken of two subsequent agreements, one of
September 24, 1918, between China and Japan, the other of May
20, 1921, between China and Germany.
The secret agreement of 1918 was secured by Japan as an
"adjustment of Questions concerning Shantung ;" it contemplates
"Phillipson, International Law and the Great War 276.
'United States Foreign Relations 1904, 122.
"China Year Book 1921-2, 662.
'China Year Book 1921-2, 68o.
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the continuance in force of the 1915 agreement and disregards
the intervening abrogation declaration; except for the last article,
in which Japan promises to abolish the civil administration estab-
lished by her in Shantung, it deals entirely with the Kiaochao-
Tsinan or, as it is usually called, the Shantung Railway, provid-
ing for its policing under Japanese regulation and for the em-
ployment of Chinese citizens on its administrative staff. Article
6 states that "The Kiaochao-Tsinaii Railway, after its ownership
is definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint en-
terprise."' China's signature to this arrangement raises the
question whether it is an admission by her Government of the
ineffectiveness of the declaration of abrogation as applied to the
Shantung concessions.
It is difficult to come to any other than an affirmative eon-
clusion so far as the railway is concerned. It is significant that
the Chinese Government, on the same day it entered into the
agreement, signed another, also secret, by which, in return for a
loan of 20,000,000 yen, it gave Japan the concession for build-
ing two branch lines for the Shantung Railway. The time of
these agreements, within two months of the armistice, was not
one likely to find the Powers anxious to assure themselves of
continued Japanese aid by an open support of these new demands.
Had China revealed them and requested the Powers to recognize
her services as an ally by using their good offices to restrain Japan
it would seem that public opinion would have compelled the Pow-
ers to do so. At least it might well have prevented Japan from
pressing her demands. China's delegates at the Peace Confer-
ence would have been in a much stronger position, though it is
doubtful whether the final decision would have been altered. As
it happened, when the agreements of 1918 were published at
Paris, the Chinese delegation felt that the ground had been cut
from under them and the Chinese people united in bitter crim-
ination of the corrupt officials who had signed the agreements.
It seems altogether likely that the compelling cause back of their
signature was not force but money.' Had it been force majeure,
'Same 702.
"'And to complete the chain of the work of consolidation she (Japan)
induced China last year when Germany was collapsing to commit her-
self with regard to the disposal of the Shantung Railway and the Kaomei
Line. Thus an open avowal was obtained from China as to her suc-
cession to Germany's rights and privileges in Shantung, in part. and
parcel . . . and what was the price of this cession on the part of those
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the agreement to let the Peace Conference decide the status of
the railway would still be valid.
The lease itself and the economic privileges not specified in
the agreements of 1918 remained in the status secured by the
declaration of abrogation. Although the Chinese repudiation of
their own declaration in its bearing upon the railway, the principal
asset of Shantung, might be construed as raising the issue of its
validity in toto, strict interpretation would maintain it in all mat-
ters not specifically excepted.
The Chinese Government declined to sign the Treaty of Peace
with Germany. The non-settlement of the Shantung Question
prior to the Sino-German Commercial Agreement of May 20,
1921, led the Japanese Government, in a note of October 20, 1921,
to assert that in it Germany took the Japanese view, that the
Treaty of Versailles effected the transfer of the German rights
and interests to Japan, and that China, as a party to the agree-
ment, had declared herself cognizant of the transfer.' The Jap-
anese assertion was based upon the article which "affirms that
Germany has been obliged by the events of the war and by the
Treaty of Versailles to renounce all the rights, interests and privil-
eges which she acquired by virtue of the Treaty concluded by her
on March 6, 1898 and otherActs concerning the Province of Shan-
tung, and finds herself deprived of the possibility of restituting
them to China."'  The reply of the Chinese Government is an ade-
quate rebuttal of the Japanese contention:
"As to the criticism directed to the declaration made by the
German representatives to China, it is to be observed that at the
time when they came to negotiate the Commercial Agreement
with China, China still insisted on her demand for the restora-
tion of Kiaochao. But, owing to the conditions of the war and
the Treaty restraint, Germany lost, by force majeure, her power
of returning Kiaochao to China, for which she expressed her re-
gret to the Chinese Government. To this, it must be also noted,
the Chinese Government has only declared its acknowledgment
of Germany's explanation as such and no more.""
who did the 'job' it might be asked? It was the paltry sum of twenty
million Japanese yen which supplied the government with funds after
August xo, i918, when the new President was installed." From an
article by Liang Chi-Chao on "The Causes of China's Defeat at the
Peace Conference," in 9 Millard's Review, July i9, 1919, 262-3. The
20,000,000 yen were squandered in fruitless military operations; North
China Herald, Feb. 8, 1919, 322.
'Peking and Tientsin Times, Oct. 21, 1921.
"China Year Book 1921-2, 738.
'Peking and Tientsin Times Nov. 5, I921.
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In other words the affirmation in the Commercial Agreement
may be interpreted only as a mutual recognition by China and
Germany of the actu'al dispossession of Germany and her conse-
quent inability to make restitution, without prejudice to either
country's judgment upon the legality of the Versailles decision.
In accordance with the introductory statement of intention
this argument has refrained from reference to the considerations
of international good will and good morals which might well
have restrained Japan from the Shantung enterprise, which has
brought her little more tbah obloquy and increased budgets. The
degree to which Japanese activities in Shantung have been found
legally justifiable is an indication of the gap that still separates
law and ethics, revealed when a strong power deals with a weaker
one. Nevertheless China's abrogation declaration is upheld, as
it would, very probably, have been upheld at Versailles, had the
Powers possessed freedom of action.
